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The University of Chicago Law Review [57:1260 theory have so far neglected.5 Hans has been the law for a century. Moreover, as the Supreme Court pointed out in 1987, Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is not a clean slate: overruling Hans would require overruling at least seventeen other cases relying on it.' Thus, even assuming that Hans was incorrectly decided, should the doctrine of stare decisis prevent the Court from overruling it?
This essay attempts to provide an answer. Part I discusses the doctrine of stare decisis and the general conditions that justify departing from precedent. Part II applies that doctrine to Hans. In particular, Part II suggests that legal circumstances since 1890 have changed so significantly that adherence to Hans is no longer justified.
I.
It is an oft-repeated maxim that courts will not rigidly apply stare decisis in constitutional cases.' Nevertheless, the Court has noted that "any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification." ' It is particularly necessary to justify overruling precedent as well-settled and consistently applied as Hans. ' Even, or perhaps especially, in the constitutional context, departures from stare decisis endanger the perceived legitimacy of I There have been occasional attempts to finesse the question. Vicki Jackson has suggested that overruling Hans would not affect subsequent caselaw, and thus that stare decisis is not a serious problem. See Jackson, 98 Yale L J at 119-24 (cited in note 4). Justice Brennan has suggested in a footnote that Hans is ripe for overruling because it has led to "erratic and irrational results" and to "inconsistencies in constitutional interpretation. " Welch, . No further elaboration has been forthcoming from either Justice Brennan or his academic supporters.
6 Welch, 483 US at 495 n 27 (1987); see also id at 496 (Scalia concurring) (statutes enacted since Hans assumed sovereign immunity).
See, for example, United States v Scott, 437 US 82, 101 (1978) , in which the Court noted:
We recognize the force of the doctrine of stare decisis, but we are conscious as well of the admonition of Mr. Justice Brandeis: "[I]n cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions. The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function." (quoting Burnet v Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 US 393, 406-408 (1932) Henry Monaghan has suggested that the danger is particularly acute in the context of the Court's reputation before the elite or scholarly class rather than before the general public. Monaghan, 88 Colum L Rev at 749. This raises the intriguing possibility that because legal academics as a group are thought to be more liberal than the current Supreme Court, overruling Hans v Louisiana will please rather than disappoint the Court's relevant audience. See, for example, Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 5-6 (Macmillan, 1990). Nevertheless, such a result-oriented analysis is an insufficient basis for justifying the overruling of a venerable case.
1, See Maltz, 1980 Wis L Rev at 472-78 (cited in note 10); Monaghan, 88 Colum L Rev at 749-51 (cited in note 10).
11 See Maltz, 1980 Wis L Rev at 468-72 (cited in note 10). 13 See cases cited in note 2. 14 See Union Gas, 109 S Ct at 2284; Garcia, 469 US at 547-55.
"slavish adherence to authority where new conditions require new rules of conduct." 15 While the Court has not been entirely clear on the conditions that justify a departure from prior precedent, scholars have identified three important concerns: 1) changed circumstances; 2) difficulty in applying the precedent; and 3) later cases inconsistent with the precedent. 16 The first and third strongly weigh in favor of overruling Hans. 1 Changed circumstances justify overruling prior precedent in two related ways. First, such changes "undermine[] the basis for the overruled decision."' Second, "an opinion emphasizing the changed circumstances naturally will contain the countersuggestion that.., the former Court might well have decided differently if confronted with today's conditions."' 9 Therefore, in examining the development of the law since Hans, I will focus on the extent to which the case depended for its legitimacy and correctness on surrounding legal circumstances that have changed.
Inconsistent subsequent law also justifies overruling precedent. In some cases, these inconsistencies can be so blatant as to justify a conclusion that the Court has already overruled the precedent; formal overruling is merely the coup de grace. In many cases, however, the inconsistency is more subtle. Indeed, even inconsistencies in areas of law that only indirectly relate to the original precedent rather than directly implicating it may justify a departure from stare decisis where the later cases "impair [the] authority" of the original precedent. 0 Thus a second factor I will examine is the extent to which later cases in related areas have left Hans without a constitutional anchor. 17 Justice Brennan's suggestion that Hans has created "irrational" results and constitutional "inconsistencies" appears in context to be primarily a charge that the Hans doctrine has become difficult to apply. Welch, 483 US at 519-20 n 19 (Brennan dissenting). He notes that the rules of sovereign immunity are a "crazy-quilt pattern." Id. In fact, although the various rules are complex to learn, they are relatively simple to apply. See text at notes 2-3. This is in stark contrast to the situation in Garcia, 469 US at 546-47, where the "governmental functions" test of National League of Cities v Usery, 426 US 833 (1976), had proved impossible to apply and thus was overruled.
11 Frickey, 2 Const Comm at 128 (cited in note 16). 388 (1958) . See also Mapp, 367 US at 653-55 (using developments in related areas to justify overruling prior precedent).
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At the time Hans was decided, it was not surprising that the Court refused to draw any distinction between diversity and federal question jurisdiction when it examined the language of the Eleventh Amendment. In 1890, there was indeed little difference between the two bases of jurisdiction in terms of the substantive law applied by the Court. By then, the federal courts interpreted the 1842 decision in Swift v Tyson 2 to require the application of federal law to both diversity and federal question actions. The only difference between a suit brought in diversity and a suit brought under federal question jurisdiction was the source of the governing federal substantive law: federal courts applied federal common law to diversity actions and either federal common law or federal statutory or constitutional law to federal question actions.
The Court originally limited the Swift doctrine to diversity cases involving the "general common law" or non-statutory law, which Swift held to encompass commercial law. 2 2 During the first half of the nineteenth century-even after Swift-the federal courts routinely applied state law in diversity cases involving "local" common law. 2 " The Supreme Court also concluded that state judicial interpretations of state statutes, as opposed to common law pronouncements, were still binding on federal courts in diversity cases. As late as 1862, the Court held that " [t] he construction given to a statute of a State by the highest judicial tribunal of such State, is regarded as a part of the statute, and is as binding upon the Courts of the United States as the text. '24 It added that this rule would apply even where a state court changed its interpretation of a statute: in that case the federal courts "w[ould] follow the latest settled adjudications. ' 
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By the late nineteenth century, however, the Court had so expanded the general law doctrine of Swift that a federal court sitting in diversity was free to ignore definitive state decisions involving both "local" law and state statutory law, including state constitutional law. The Court began to chip away at the settled general law limitations on Swift as early as 1864.7 Historian Carl Swisher has noted that during the second half of the nineteenth century, "[tihe Supreme Court began to challenge not merely state court interpretations of the common law but also state statutes violating principles or practices in which the Court believed." 2 Justice Field, writing in 1893, complained that "learned judges have fallen into the habit of repeating [the Swift general law] doctrine as a convenient mode of brushing aside the law of a State in conflict with their views.
This process of expanding the definition of "general law" was most striking in the context of state constitutional rulings. A series of cases interpreting state bond issues illustrates the growth of federal common law during this period. The Court first held that it would no longer be bound by state decisions reversing earlier state interpretations, regardless of the character of the state law at issue. In Gelpcke v Dubuque, the Court confronted a situation in which the Iowa Supreme Court had recently overruled a series of earlier 30 lt Iowa cases. In its latest pronouncement, the state supreme court had held that state legislation authorizing the issuance of railroad bonds violated the Iowa constitution.
3 1 The United States Supreme Court nevertheless upheld the validity of the bonds, holding that it would not "follow every such oscillation" in the state courts because the bonds had been issued and purchased in reliance upon 217 Gelpcke v Dubuque, 68 US 175 (1864). Several years earlier, however, the Court had refused to overturn its own interpretation of state law in the face of a subsequent conflicting state interpretation. See Rowan v Runnels, 46 US 134 (1847), in which the Court adhered to Groves v Slaughter, 40 US 449 (1841) (interpreting Mississippi constitution not to prohibit sale of slaves), despite an intervening state decision construing the state constitution differently. Thus the erosion of the limitations on Swift may have begun only a few years after Swift itself. The major shift did not occur until the 1870s and 1880s, however, as described in the text. 
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The Eleventh Amendment the earlier state cases upholding the constitutionality of bond legislation. 2 The Court's opinion in Gelpcke, however, also contained the seeds of further expansion of federal authority under diversity jurisdiction. The Court noted-in dicta that would later become law-that it rejected the latest Iowa pronouncement in part because the earlier decisions it overruled were "sustained by reason and authority" and were "in harmony with the adjudications of sixteen States of the Union." 3 3 Only seven years later, the Court began moving away from the idea that only "oscillations" in the state court would justify ignoring state interpretations of state constitutions. In City v Lamson, the Court upheld the validity of railroad bonds under the Wisconsin Constitution, despite recent state decisions holding such bonds unconstitutional. 3 4 The Court purportedly relied on Gelpcke, noting that the bonds had been issued and purchased in reliance upon earlier Wisconsin decisions upholding the constitutionality of bond legislation. 5 In fact, however, the only Wisconsin decisions addressing the constitutionality of bonds cited by the Court were handed down several years after the issuance of the bonds in question. 6 Thus, in reality, Gelpcke was not controlling.
Despite its misstatement of the facts, Lamson technically remained within the limits of Gelpcke, at least in its statement of the law. Later cases, however, ignored the Gelpcke rule altogether and refused to follow state decisions even where there had been no prior ruling and thus no "oscillation" or overruling.
In 1873, the Court essentially opened the door for the federal courts to consider any state constitutional ruling a matter of "gen-11 68 US at 205-06. See also Douglass v County of Pike, 101 US 677, 679 (1880) ("The question presented ... is not so much whether these late decisions are right, as whether they should be followed in cases having reference to bonds put out and in the hands of innocent purchasers when they were announced.").
One historical explanation for Gelpcke and its progeny turns on the unfairness of the retroactive state court decisions. Although limiting decisions to prospective effect is common today, it was much less accepted in the nineteenth-century age of common law formalism. eral law" within the Swift doctrine. In Whiting v Fond du Lac Railroad Co., the Wisconsin Supreme Court had declared that the railroad bond legislation violated the state constitution on the ground that such bonds permitted taxation for a private, rather than a public, purpose. 37 In Olcott v Supervisors, however, the United States Supreme Court rejected the Whiting rule and upheld the issuance of the bonds. 3 8 The Court first noted the general rule that federal courts would follow state court decisions "respecting the construction of their own constitutions and laws. '3'9 The Court went on, however, to declare that the question of the uses for which taxes could be levied was "not one of [state constitutional] interpretation or construction" but was rather "a question of general law." ' 0 Thus, after Olcott, the federal courts no longer needed the Gelpcke oscillation doctrine to reject state interpretations of state constitutions.
Indeed, during the 1870s and 1880s, the Supreme Court frequently refused to follow even state court decisions of first impression. 4 ' The Court simply made its own decision about what the state constitution meant. Sometimes it combined its own analysis of the question with a perfunctory bow to Gelpcke. 42 At least once, the Court followed its prior interpretation of the state constitution even where the plaintiffs acquired the bonds at issue after the state court had rejected the Supreme Court interpretation and had declared the bonds unconstitutional. 3 The Court in that case noted that the dispositive question was not the date of the bonds but the substantive question of their constitutionality. 44 Sometimes the Court did not even pretend that the state constitutional law it ignored was in flux. In 1873, for example, the Jus-Article III jurisprudence, leaving it a vestigial anomaly. Hans, justifiable (or at least understandable) when it was decided, now stands as the lone remainder of what was once an integrated and prevailing view of the interrelationship between diversity and federal question jurisdiction. As such, it is ripe for overruling.
the Chisholm Court's mistaken application of federal law to a state question (sovereign immunity) in a diversity suit. Amar, 96 Yale L J at 1473-75 (cited in note 4). Amar's sophisticated analysis supports the thesis that Swift was incorrect as a matter of constitutional interpretation, although it still does not justify departing from stare decisis by overruling Hans. One commentator has also made a rather confused argument that Erie, if historically correct, would demand that the federal courts apply the state's own law of sovereign immunity, and thus that had the Erie doctrine prevailed in 1793, Chisholm would not have been decided the way it was. 
